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RELIGION, STORY AND THE LAW OF CONTRACTS:
REPLY TO PROFESSOR BERMAN
Andrew W. McThenia, Jr. *
Contract law, pronounced dead' within the last decade, has un-
dergone a Lazarus-like resurrection. The revival of scholarship runs
the gamut from Professor Charles Fried's writing asserting promise as
"the moral basis of contract law,"2 through the Second Restatement
of Contracts 3 which concedes the legitimacy of more communal based
doctrines such as promissory estoppel,4 to the writings of Professor
Ian MacNeil who argues that community is "the fundamental root,
the base" of contract5 and the even more collectivist writings of schol-
ars in the Conference on Critical Legal Studies.6
This revival of contract scholarship does not yet suggest any uni-
fying theme, but it does, I think, indicate a vigorous search for some
means of weaving together seemingly intractable concepts. This sym-
posium on Law and Religion suggests an important area of search.
That is, it invites us to examine the shared ethos of our culture.
I agree with Professor Berman's observation made elsewhere that
law and religion are "two different but interrelated aspects . . .of
social experience" and that one cannot flourish without the other.7
Because both law and religion are aspects of our social experience,
one's view of God and the world must certainly affect one's view of
the law. Similarly, one's view of the law probably affects how that
person views God.'
If one's view of the world is that of man as a high stakes gambler,
• Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. I am grateful for the advice and
assistance of Sam Calhoun, Ed Gaffney, Jeff Jones, Anne McThenia, Nancy Taylor, and Tom
Shaffer.
1. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
2. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
4. Id. § 90 (1981).
5. I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 1 (1980).
6. See, e.g., Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678
(1984); Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829 (1983) (herein-
after Critical Approaches); M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860 (1977); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1983).
7. H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 11 (1983).
8. Shaffer, Jurisprudence in Light of the Hebraic Faith, 1 NOTRE DAME J. OF LAW,
ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY 77, 108 (1984).
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a lonely Robinson Crusoe, or a latter day Horatio Alger living in a
minimalist state, then that would suggest a view of contract law not
out of sorts with Professor Fried's world of promise.9 If one thinks
that the world is not quite so lonely or individualistic, then she might
think of contract in terms of more communal norms of reliance or the
prevention of unjust enrichment.
I disagree with Professor Fried's conclusion that the moral basis
of contract is promise, for that seems much too limiting to me. I am
of the view that Professors MacNeil and Unger are more nearly cor-
rect in viewing the essence of contract as community. I think the
social matrix of the world is more fundamental than promise.
Many Americans, probably a majority, view the world from
within the Jewish and Christian traditions. I think it is in our heri-
tage of a covenantal community that we should begin our conversa-
tion and search.
As recorded in Mark's gospel:
Jesus said, 'The first commandment is this: Hear, 0 Israel: The
Lord our God is the only Lord. Love the Lord your God with all
your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind, and with all
your strength. The second is this: Love your neighbor as yourself.
There is no other commandment greater than these.' Mark 12:29-
31.
That "restatement" of the law by Rabbi Jesus contains an impor-
tant negative principle and the basis for an extremely radical ethic.
The important limitation which we as lawyers need always be
mindful of is that the law is not God, the state is not God, Marx is not
God nor is capitalism God. To make the law a civil religion is to be
idolatrous.10 One of the two major themes of the biblical tradition is
the fear of idolatry, "the fear that man might accept a limited worldly
objective as an adequate goal of his striving."'" We are warned to be
especially skeptical of social structures that seek to take the place of
God. The political, social, and economic institutions we inherit and
are a part of have a profound effect on how we view the world. Yet
we often are unaware of how important the effect of institutional
forms is upon our moral perceptions.' 2 The negative admonition of
the Torah and the Gospel warns us to be careful lest we accept the
"is" as the "ought."
9. See FRIED, supra note 2.
10. See Shaffer, supra note 8, at 77.
11. R.UNGER, PASSION 26 (1984).
12. See ESSAYS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (M. Douglas ed. 1982).
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The positive theme of this "restatement" of the law by Rabbi
Jesus is that love is to be the driving force of humanity. We are called
to a personal encounter with one another. It is in our relations with
each other that we are transformed.13 What is fundamental about the
Christian tradition is that our identity is constructed around the nar-
rative of the cross. Our identity as individuals and community is rein-
terpreted by means of the identity of Jesus Christ, a story which
culminates in the passion, in the cross. I For Christian believers, the
point of the passion narratives is not that Jesus died in heroic despair,
but that his death was followed by resurrection. It was that resurrec-
tion which has enabled Christians down through the ages to identify
Jesus as the crucified Messiah; and it is that event which links mem-
ory to hope. The resurrection compels the Christian community to
look to the future in hope and anticipation of the consummation of
the Christian story. The death and resurrection of Jesus represent for
Christians that call to a personal encounter and love.
As Harold Berman has said: "Society moves inevitably into the
future. But it does so by walking backwards."1 5 It is in the shared
stories of our tradition that we might find out what is at stake as we
search for some way to make sense of modem contract law. The
shared stories of our culture are important not to resolve conflicts
inherent in modem day contract, but to place the conflicting norms in
a matrix which is familiar to most Americans. We do not necessarily
learn how to act from the retelling of the stories of our tradition, but
we may be able to perceive what is at stake as we think about the
seemingly intractable problems of our law of contract. A backward
walk in our tradition may show us a way to appreciate the present and
to approach the future.
I want to be clear that a return to our origins will not resolve the
problems of expectation versus reliance, or, to use Unger's language-
conflicting visions of freedom of contract and freedom to contract on
the one hand and counter visions of reliance and fairness on the
other. 16 In fact, such a journey may well heighten the conflicts. But
conflict, too, is valuable.
One of the truths of modern contract law is a recognition that
there are conflicting values operating in any serious dispute. But this
recognition of disorder and conflict is to a large extent hidden in the
13. See UNGER, supra note 11, at 24.
14. S. HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER 66-71 (1981).
15. BERMAN, supra note 7, at 41.
16. See Unger, supra note 6, at 567, 616-648.
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way these conflicts are "resolved" in modem contract litigation. The
dominant story of contract litigation is of the search for truth by bal-
ancing (or mediating) conflicting claims of individual versus commu-
nal values before an impartial tribunal. One of the major and
important criticisms of contract litigation offered by the Critical Legal
Studies writers is to challenge the truth of that story. 7 The erroneous
belief that these important conflicts can be reconciled by adjudication
tends to disguise the true nature of the conflict between important
norms and to knock the sharp edges from the competing values so
that they seem fuzzy and relativistic.
An appeal to biblical tradition to understand the moral bases of
the competing norms of contract law does not permit the glossing of
the neoclassical analysis. Stories from that tradition tell us clearly
what is at stake when we make moral claims.
I do not suggest that we look to the Bible to resolve contract
disputes, nor do I suggest a ireconsecration of law or the return to a
theocracy. What I am suggesting is that stories from the Jewish and
Christian traditions may shed light on what is at stake when we con-
sider the conflicts between promise and reliance. In my view, this
suggestion is legitimate if only because cultures which are influenced
by the Bible have a different feeling for history than those shaped by
other traditions.
It might be useful to reach back into the biblical stories to see
what is involved when we appeal to norms of promise and reliance,
two important norms which are often at odds in modern contract
disputes.
First, promise. Why should I keep a promise made to you? Pro-
fessor Fried's analysis of this, question is interesting.18 He analyzes
and rejects utilitarian grounds and concludes that the obligation to
keep a promise has an independent moral force that cannot be ex-
plained by nonpromisory elements such as reliance or benefit. 19 He
concludes that the moral force of promise keeping is grounded in the
concept of personal autonomy.2 He does, however, emphasize the
importance of trust to the moral obligation of promise keeping. 2I He
attempts to associate trust with the concept of personal autonomy,
17. See Feinman, supra note 6, Critical Approaches at 844-57.






and to avoid linking it to reliance or other communal values.22 While
his argument is powerful, it is ultimately unpersuasive.
I would like to pick up on his argument and suggest another in-
terpretation. As Fried notes, when we use the convention of promis-
ing, we invite vulnerability. That gives us power over the other who
has made herself vulnerable. What does it mean to be vulnerable? It
means that we let down the walls of self-protection which shield us
from pain but which also isolate us from love.
There can be nothing more important to the self than to be ac-
cepted for what she is; to be shed of the frightening howl of loneliness;
to be a person. One can only be fully human when she is accepted,
warts and all. by her neighbor. That is to be loved. Love can only
follow if one acknowledges vulnerability, if one will tear down the
walls of self protection which shield us. Yet the paradox of life is that
the same walls which shield us from love also protect us from death
and destruction. But we cannot have it any other way. To experience
love we must risk destruction. We must be vulnerable.
The institution of promise is important in a penultimate sense; it
is important because it leads to something else and that something
else is the vulnerability that is the necessary soil for love. The Geth-
semane story23 is about many things, but one of its major themes is
the necessity for vulnerability in our intimate personal encounters.
What is so universal about the Gethsemane story, I think, is its
repeatability. If we are to be fully human, we can find ourselves
where Christ was following at that time of prayer, alone and totally
vulnerable. An interesting aspect of the story is that suffering is por-
trayed as evil. Evil is evil, and the Gospel accounts do not try to
make suffering into something holy. Nor do the Gospel accounts at-
tempt to alleviate our fears of suffering. What the Gospels tell us is
that we must be ready to pick up the cross and follow Him to die.
Only if we can trust that our God is a loving God and be obedient to
Him can we erase the walls in which we encase ourselves in order to
avoid pain and death. Jesus was obedient. To be obedient means to
wipe out all the self protecting walls we build for ourselves.
The ultimate value of promise is that it encourages us to trust
and to be vulnerable. The law's chief justification and also its chief
purpose is, as Harold Berman has noted, "to help create conditions in
22. Id.
23. See Matthew 26:36-56; Mark 14:32-50; Luke 22:39-53; John 18:1-11.
1251
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION
which love may flourish."'2 4 That is, I think, the most important rea-
son for enforcing promises.
Another important concept in contract law is reliance. Let me
suggest a story which might sharpen our perspective on that notion.
The concept of reliance in contract law is often discussed in connec-
tion with norms of benevolence, trust, and fairness." Consider for a
moment the parable of the Good Samaritan in the Gospel of Luke.26
On the level of a story of conventional morality it represents an appeal
to benevolence or altruism, both aspects of the scriptural virtue of
neighborliness. Both of these virtues are appealed to as support for
the reliance principle. But the parable is much more radical than
that. The question we are asked to consider is: Who is my neighbor?
The story was addressed to Jews who would have been expected to
identify not with the Samaritan, but with the injured Jew lying by the
side of the road. Yet, the parable focuses on the acts of the Samari-
tan, his goodness, and not on the needs of the injured man. To enter-
tain the possibility that a Samaritan, an outcast who was despised on
both racial and religious grounds, would perform good deeds was not
just counterintuitive, it was unthinkable. The parable confronts the
hearer with a radical challenge to her preconceived notions of reality.
It is like asking us to consider that perhaps our neighbors in the times
of our need will be Muslim terrorists or Iranians or Russians.
We are challenged beyond benevolence or altruism and asked to
reconsider our whole self-constructed universe or order, to "conceive
the inconceivable. 21 7 We are asked to imagine a society in which we
recognize our mutual interdependence with brothers and sisters of all
kinds and from all stations i:n life.
It is not that these stories tell us how to act in any given situa-
tion. They certainly do not tell us how to resolve contract disputes.
Their value, however, is that they tell us how to perceive. Stories tell
us how we might view the world. These stories have to do with
vision.
One vision these stories offer is that promise is important because
it leads us to vulnerability and to love and that we are all vulnerable
to pain and death. Who will be our neighbors in that time? Martin
24. H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 82 (1974).
25. See Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Es-
toppel, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 52 (1981).
26. Luke 10:30-36.
27. N. PERRIN, THE NEW TESTAMENT, AN INTRODUCTION 293 (1974).
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Buber captures that vision which I think is important to our consider-
ation of contract norms:
... the inmost growth of the self is not accomplished, as people like
to suppose today, in man's relation to himself, but in the relation
between the one and the other, between men, that is, preeminently
in the mutuality of the making present-in the making present of
another self and in the knowledge that one is made present in his
own self by the other-together with the mutuality of acceptance,
of affirmation and confirmation.2
He goes on to ask, rhetorically: Is there a way to help which is
interpersonal, interhuman, beyond professionalism, and not insular:
"I think no human being can give more than this. Making life possi-
ble for the other, if only for a moment."29
These musings lead me to a vision of community in which prom-
ise is important, but primarily because it fosters greater trust and vul-
nerability and leads to love. Reliance is important because it forces us
to see our mutual interdependence.
We are born in community, and I believe that the most impor-
tant thing we can do in that community is to build and nurture rela-
tionships with our neighbors. The biblical call to justice is to create
structures in which we can be vulnerable with one another and in
which the chance for the transformative personal relationship of love
is given primacy. We are called to expand our boundaries and con-
cepts of neighborliness and to accept the stranger into our world.
I do not mean to suggest that communities cannot become tyran-
nical. The lessons of history are too clear on that to invite argument.
We cannot deny those stories of slavery, the oppressive treatment of
deviants, and so forth. Our only escape from stories of the tyranny of
communities comes from having the courage to confront those stories
and to participate in a world that claims our lives in a fundamental
fashion, more fundamental than the claims of the state or the law. It
comes only if we recognize the ultimate claim that only God is God.
It is only in such a world that any possibility of acquiring those
virtues of hope and patience exists which are capable of countering a
tyranny of majoritarian rule or our mutual destruction by rampant
individualism. Professor Stanley Hauerwas' comments on this long
view of history are apt:
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Without denying that there may be nonreligious accounts of
hope and patience, Jews and Christians have been the people that
have stressed the particular importance of these virtues. For they
are the people formed by the conviction that our existence is
bounded by a power that is good and faithful. Moreover they are
peoples with a deep stake in history; they believe God has charged
them with the task of witnessing to his providential care of our
existence. They believe their history is nothing less than the story
of God's salvation of them and all people. Such a history does not
promise to make the life of virtue easier or our existence safer.
Rather such a story, and corresponding society, offers training in
the hope and patience necessary to live amid the diversity of the
world while trusting that its very plurality reflects the richness of
God's creating and redeeming purposes.30
My comments offer little advice on what to do. But I think far
more important than deciding what to do is to understand who we
are. If we talk about that enough, then we might discover what we
should do.
30. HAUERWAS, supra note 14, at 128.
